- Crackers who criminally support government officers attack this Web site: modifying the code of graphic files to change images (for example, the Georgia farm work photograph as it appeared on 20 November 2007), modifying the code of text files (for example, inserting a URL into code in the research tips WEb page in early June 2008), and adding and deleting files (for example, the Utah photograph's absence on 20 November 2007). Persistent, brazen criminality by some government officers is a reason for this Web site. Please continue to inform us about the sabotage. We deeply appreciate the clues we have occasionally gotten.
- Welcome to the world's safest Web site. You won't find a Web site which causes less violence than this one.
There is a huge amount of violence in the world, and a huge number of Web sites. How much violence is caused by Web sites, and how much by other forms of communication (for example: face-to-face conversations, telephone conversations, and newspaper articles)? Websites are astoundingly, incredibly, amazingly safe. This Web site has been on the Web for years, and has done no harm. This Web site is not intended to cause violence (for example, great bodily harm) or anything else bad. Do not feel threatened by this consistently harmless Web site.
- This Web site's contents are not secret, private, confidential, or personal (except some information which is personal in the limited sense that it pertains to persons). This Web site re-publishes home addresses, which other publishers (on and off the Web) also provide. If someone's home address is available from a public source, his address is not secret, confidential, or private. Because of the avalanche of information available to the public as a result of the information revolution, it is often easy for amateur investigators to legally find out where government officers live.
- Properly preparing for court cases often requires investigating the witnesses, especially witnesses likely to testify. This investigation requires knowing the witnesses' home addresses.
It often is legal to picket a government officer's home. That legal picketing requires knowing the home address. In deciding which home to picket, consider whether the visual background (trees, houses, etc.) would look nice on TV, and the pickets' opinions of the resident's official conduct. It may be impressive to reporters if some people on the picket line personally suffered from what they are picketing about.
Studying nepotism in government requires knowing government officers' home addresses.
To best understand and predict campaign contributions, it is helpful to know where the candidate has lived and who has lived near him.
Public knowledge of the home address of political candidates is a crucial part of democracy in America. Consider someone who wants to run for office (judge or district attorney, for example). Someone asks voters to sign a petition so that the candidate's name may be on a ballot. The candidate's name is John Smith. A voter, asked to sign a petition, wants to know which John Smith is involved. The petition clearly identifies John Smith who lives at 1234 Liberty Street in Liberty City. That's the John Smith whose name may be on the ballot. If John Smith is on the ballot, voters may ask which John Smith. The one on the ballot is the one who lives at 1234 Liberty Street. If John Smith won the election, there is a question of which John Smith won. The winner is John Smith who lives at 1234 Liberty Street. In American elections, a candidate's home address is a crucial part of his identification. Attempts to keep politicians' home addresses secret from the public (for example, by attacking this Web site) interfere with American democracy.
To discover suspicious or illegal conduct by government officers, the investigator usually benefits from knowing where the officers live (especially when the suspect's home is crucial to the conduct being investigated) and who the officer's relatives are. A few examples are.
- Illinois's Cook county state representative Patricia Bailey's false home address
- Federal house majority leader John A. Boehner's District of Columbia basement apartment rented from lobbyist John D. Milne
- Los Angeles County Supervisor Yvonne Braithwaite Burke's principal residence on Mandeville Canyon Road, outside her district.
- California's federal representative Randall H. "Duke" Cunningham's Del Mar area home, Rancho Santa Fe home, and District of Columbia residential yacht
- California assembly candidate Noreen Marie Evans's campaign fund paid Evans's son Joel as a campaign consultant when he was a high school student living in her home. We (not the government) discovered her son-consultant's campaign income and brought it to the public's attention. We discovered that because we found out (over the Internet) Evans's home address, her son's full name (Joel's surname differs from his father's surname and his mother's surname, according to campaign records), where her son was living when he attended high school, and when her son graduated from high school. To catch government officers (Evans was a Santa Rosa city government officer when her campaign fund paid her son), the public needs to freely share (for example, by re-publishing over the Internet) publicly available information about government officers and their resident relatives. By the way, it is common for government officers (for example, those who hold elective office or control campaign funds) to arrange for their resident relatives to receive suspicious payments and other valuable things.
- the 26 May 2006 traffic stop of New Jersey attorney general Zulima Farber's live-in boyfriend, a court officer.
- New Orleans judge Alan Green, who is federal representative William Jennings "Bill" Jefferson's brother-in-law (Alan's sister Andrea is William's wife), supposedly was video taped getting an eight hundred dollar, cash contribution for his niece (state legislator Jalila Jefferson, who is William Jefferson's daughter). The eight hundred dollars supposedly never got from judge Green to Jalila Jefferson's campaign. The cash payment was made in the judge's office by a lawyer with a court case before the judge. Later, the judge decided the case for that lawyer's client, awarding that client even more money than his lawyer had requested.
- stock and money which were criminally, indirectly paid to Louisiana's federal representative William Jennings "Bill" Jefferson by paying The ANJ Group, a company owned by Jefferson's children and controlled by his wife Andrea.
- renovation of New York city correction and police commissioner Bernard B. Kerik's apartment in the Riverdale neighborhood of the Bronx borough of New York city
- Brett M. Pfeffer, a former aide of federal representative William Jennings Jefferson, conspired with him that Jefferson would help a Nigerian company, W2-IBBS, in exchange for bribes: Jefferson's daughter-lawyer would be on the payroll of Pfeffer's investment company, Jefferson's daughters would be given stock in W2-IBBS, legal work would go to a member of Jefferson's family (a member other than the above-mentioned daughter-lawyer), and political contributions would be paid to William Jefferson's daughter Jalila Jefferson-Bullock.
- White House presidential adviser Karl Rove's simultaneous District of Columbia homestead and Texas voter registration
- work on Connecticut governor John G. Rowland's Litchfield home
- New York City police commissioner Howard Safir's private investigation business (an actual conflict of interest owned in the names of his wife and child when he was commissioner)
- Alaska's federal senator Theodore Fulton "Ted" Stevens's improved house in Girdwood neighborhood of Anchorage. The form of his supposed corruption (in which a briber pays a construction company to improve realty owned by a government officer) was also supposedly done, in the opinion of some people, to improve realty owned by former correction commissioner Bernard Kerik of New York City. This is a common kind of corruption. To try to impede or discover this kind of corruption, it is useful to have detailed records of realty of government officers; for example: how many bedrooms and fireplaces, what floors are covered with (for example, rubber tile or marble), and whether walls are painted plasterboard or paneled with expensive wood). This Web site provides some such records for some government officers.
- If a government officer publishes a statement about himself, we have the right to investigate that statement and publish the results of our investigation on the Web.
- Home address information can be used to sell real estate ("the president lives there, the governor lives two blocks away, the mayor lives on this block, the Foobarian ambassador lives across the street, a member of Congress lives in this building" etc.). Home address information can be used to conduct sightseeing tours ("the president lives there, the governor lives there, the mayor lives there, the Foobarian ambassador lives there, the police chief lives there" etc.).
- This Web site can help people better understand what's important to them. For example, according to a 25 March 2008 post at URL www.smartfellowspress.com/_0208/0000007a.htm of smartfellowpress Web forum, someone (Solitairea1) investigated the word "Southerlyn", the name of a character (A.D.A. Serena Southerlyn) in a popular, American, TV series (Law and Order). According to the post, the investigation led to actress Elisabeth Rohm, which lead to her father, Eberhard Rohm. According to a 26 March 2008 post at URL www.smartfellowspress.com/_0208/0000007e.htm, which was at the same forum, Solitairea1 found out about the father from a few sources including a New York State page of our Web site. We're pleased to have helped Solitaire1 learn about the world around him.
- Seemingly lawful Web sites link to this Web site. Those links are evidence that this Web site has legitimate value.
- In general, the free flow of information promotes democracy, prosperity, lawfulness, scholarly research, and fun.
- This noncommercial Web site is a labor of love. We don't want your money.
- Let's remember every day our brothers and sisters who are prisoners throughout the world.
-
IMPORTANT NOTICE
This Web site and all of its contents are provided as is, solely for informational purposes, and without warranty. There is no express warranty, no implied warranty, and no warranty of fitness for an intended purpose. We are not liable for informational errors or incompleteness. We have no duty to update anything. Verify all statements and claims. Carefully read and consider many sources of information, analysis, and opinion. Please inform us of each and every falsehood in this Web site. We own all email messsages and other communications to us. This Web site contains parody and humor. Our linking to a Web site is not approval or endorsement. Our discussions and editorials do not necessarily apply to anyone named or identified in this Web site.
- Please do not confuse us with the government. We are expert and do not cause violence. Please do not libel or slander us. Please do not write that this astoundingly safe Web site is dangerous.
- We do not intentionally communicate or otherwise make available to the general public this Web site.
- Access to Information
- Abstract Statement
It is common for government officers to illegally get, and to illegally distribute, information. This twin problem is often a serious crime yet too few government officers go to prison or even get misdemeanor tickets for doing this crime.
- Sacramento sheriff's information distribution practices
After a deputy sheriff working as a jail C.O. (correctional officer) was suspected of involvement in the fatal shooting of a prison C.O., the Sacramento County sheriff's staff investigated whether that deputy may have improperly gotten information from the sheriff's computers. Below, as well as we can, we summarize an accusation that the suspect improperly got information and the possible implication that he may have improperly provided some of that information to at least one of his brothers.
According to "State Worker: Unauthorized access raises big questions" (by Jon Ortiz, jortizATsacbee.com, 30 October 2008, page 3A, which appeared on the Sacramento Bee Web site at URL www.sacbee.com/737/story/1355420.html), "... Former Sacramento County [California, USA] Deputy Sheriff Chu Vue reportedly used a department computer to look up personal information on Steve Lo shortly before the state correctional officer [Lo] was gunned down ....". Former county deputy sheriff Chu Vue worked at RCCC (Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center) jail in Sacramento County. State C.O. (correctional officer) Steve Lo worked at California Medical Facility in Vacaville, also called Vacaville prison. According to "Ex-deputy linked to officer's killing booked on computer charges" by Sam Stanton, sstantonATsacbee.com, 7 January 2009, at the Sacramento Bee Web site: county deputy sheriff Chu Vue is thought to have accessed sheriff's computers looking for names similar to Steve Lo 23 times. There is a computer at every sheriff's deputy workstation at RCCC jail. The computers are supposed to be used by deputies for the sole purpose of researching inmates in their custody. That research might involve looking up an inmate's criminal history and that inmate's associates. We guess that, in RCCC and other poorly run sheriffs' jails, many sworn officers have used the sheriff's computers to get information about people the officers are curious about (for example: neighbors, possible romantic partners, landlords and other vendors) even when the information is not work-related. This is illegal and it is common in poorly run jails. We don't know what procedures, if any, the sheriff routinely uses to systematically spot and investigate suspicious computer research by sworn officers. For example, if Officer Brown buys a house in November 2007 from Sam Seller and his wife, does the sheriff's staff (internal affairs, perhaps) check if there was any computer research, using the sheriff's computers, about The Sellers in 2007? If there was such research, there are many questions to ask; for example, was the research done by Brown or while Brown was on duty? If Officer Dawes is sued for divorce by his wife in July 2006, and his wife is represented by lawyer Lawson, does the sheriff's staff check if there was any computer research, using the sheriff's computers, about Lawson in 2006? If there was research about Lawson, it would be interesting to know, among many other things, on what day Dawes was handed the divorce court papers and on what day there was research about Lawson. When litigants had a civil lawsuits against the Office of the Sheriff (often called the Sheriff's Department) or any other county agency, regardless of whether the litigants were plaintiffs or defendants, were the sheriff's computers used to do research about those litigants, including research into any criminal record the litigants or their associates had? When candidates ran for sheriff or other governmental office, were the sheriff's computers used to do research about those candidates? Were the sheriff's computers used to do research about paladium.net (this Web site) or people thought to be affiliated with it?
It's common to confiscate equipment used to do a crime (confiscation of an "instrumentality of crime"); for example, a car used to criminally transport drugs. Should the sheriff's computer system be confiscated as an instrument of crime (for example, the murder of Lo or the criminal research supposedly done by Vue)? Maybe the more crimes are done with something, the more appropriate it is to confiscate it. We guess that, for reasons the sheriff knows best, the Sheriff's Department does not find out how much criminal use is made of its computer system. Maybe, if the owner of property engages in only perfunctory attempts to prevent criminal use of his property, and if the property is used to do a serious crime, the property should be confiscated. Maybe it's not enough to prosecute Vue. Maybe one should confiscate the tools (especially the computer systems and data bases) Vue supposedly used to do the supposed computer crimes. Maybe the sheriff is so powerful, and he needs the computer system and databases so much, that he should be allowed to keep them regardless of how many crimes a day are done with them and of how slightly he tries to prevent those crimes.
One of the functions of prosecution and sentencing is to deter third parties from the crime for which the defendant is being prosecuted. A prosecution should be handled in a way designed to prevent recurrence of the crime by anyone. In theory, there may be a conflict of interest for the D.A. The D.A. should handle the case in a way which is best for the people of California, the plaintiff. In theory, what may be best for the plaintiff is to confiscate the sheriff's computer system. The D.A. may be reluctant to seek confiscation because the D.A. may be reluctant to antagonize the sheriff. Maybe a special prosecutor should be appointed to handle the Lo case, a prosecutor who would, if he thought it appropriate, seek confiscation of the instrumentality of computer crimes done by sworn officers in Sacramento. There is the appearance of a conflict of interest. We guess that the D.A. thinks that the sheriff should be allowed to keep his computer system and databases regardless of how many crimes a day are done with them. Thus, we guess that there is no actual conflict of interest.
Sacramento should have a sheriff who does not recklessly distribute secret information. Maybe the county could, for the jail and other functions now now performed by the sheriff, either contract with a different law enforcement agency or create a new law enforcement agency. For example, maybe the county could create a correction department to run its jails, and the boss of that department could avoid recklessly distributing secret information.
Sacramento sheriff's officers, on the lookout for crime and suspicious behavior, routinely patrol streets and neighborhoods but not their own computer system's research records (including logs of inquiries of databases by deputies), we guess. It's not enough to have traffic laws. There are deputies who issue traffic tickets. In addition to drug laws, there are police who enforce drug laws. Some police officers entrap people into doing drug crimes. It's not enough to tell deputies what computer research is allowed and what isn't. Records of computer research should routinely be systematically examined to detect suspicious use, and that use should be investigated. An interesting possibility is to entrap deputies into criminal research using the sheriff's computers.
We guess that the person who looked for information about Lo knew that there was much forbidden research, using the sheriff's computers, but had not heard of punishment being imposed for that forbidden research. In our opinion, the Sacramento sheriff's department seems not to routinely, systematically examine its own computer research records to look for suspicious research by its officers.
According to our understanding of news articles on the Web, which articles are not necessarily perfectly true: Vue (a deputy sheriff working as a C.O. in a county jail) got information about Lo from the sheriff's computers while Vue was on the job, Lo was shot soon after (not by Vue), and Vue's brothers are currently sought. With rare exceptions, C.O.s are not detectives or investigators. In properly run jails, the vast majority of C.O.s have limited information about prisoners and never investigate prisoners or their associates. For example as far as we know about properly run jails, the vast majority of C.O.s there are not even told what crimes the prisoners are accused of or were convicted of. For government officers to be physically safe, the government should carefully restrict what information about government officers the government provides to government officers. The Sacramento sheriff recklessly distributes much information, thus endangering government officers and other people.
Knowingly illegal research by government officers, who do the research for their own personal benefit, not to accomplish a government goal, is common. Much of it could easily be prevented. After the illegal research is done, victims should at least be notified and compensated even when the wrongdoers are not punished.
The value of officers' illegally gotten information is taxable as a kind of income, we guess. Assessing the value can be complicated. In assessing value, we would consider, among other things, what the information would cost if the officer had bought it (for example, from a private investigator).
The above Vue-Lo discussion was first written in February 2009, when Vue had not been tried for anything related to Lo. No one is guilty merely because he's prosecuted.
- Diallo
This Web site resembles Amadou Diallo: harmless and legal. American courts zealously protect freedom of speech on the Web.
- Germans
Contemporary Germans taught us why we should make this Web site and often remind us to add to it.
- For years, the most visited page at this Web site was the New York Police Department page. For years, a high proportion of visits to this Web site were from New York City's police department. For example, in November 2001, nypd.org was the American domain which was the source of the most visits to this Web site (particularly blue.nypd.org). For another example, in early May 2005, the I.P. address which most visited this Web site connected to the Internet through the New York City Police Department, and was used by the New York City Police Department.
- Our phones and computers are tapped. On at least one of our phone numbers, we can't get a dial tone any more. On at least one of our phone numbers: once more, when people call us, they think the phone rings but it doesn't. Our premises are bugged. People near us often say "Fuck you." to us, sometimes as their entire statement. Our premises were entered, and crimes done there, when we were not there. Some facts suggest that some of this misconduct has been supervised or coordinated by someone who has been in law enforcement. Many prisoners in G8 countries receive more privacy and less crime than we. We guess that others in this country are treated worse than we are and we wish that we could help them.
- Alois Mannichl of Bavaria, Germany 2009may22
- Mannichl
Passau police chief Alois Mannichl reported that, on 13 December 2008, he was stabbed at his home by a stranger who seemed politically motivated. Mannichl owned the weapon. After the stabbing, the stranger threw the weapon away. It was recovered and inspected. The weapon seems to have lacked, as far as we know, evidence such as DNA, clothing fibers, and fingerprints. There was no witness other than the victim and the stabber. Although the victim was stabbed at his home, police waited days before questioning members of the victim's household. We don't know why there was such a big delay.
After the stabbing, there was uproar: international publicity, a parade, and talk of outlawing a small, political party which some people thought was related to the politically motivated, stabbing stranger. We guess that that party was unrelated to the stabber or any other aspect of the stabbing.
In Germany and most other countries which are not predominantly English-speaking, police have files on most adults even in the absence of criminal activity or suspiciousness. As an example of how many people are covered by those files: in Germany and many other countries, citizens do not contact election agencies to register to vote. Election agencies automatically register citizens based on information provided by police. In Germany and many other countries with those comprehensive files, the files include a facial photograph. Mannichl described the stabber well. Police investigated in Germany, Austria, and the Czech Republic, all of which have the police file system described above. Police failed to find the stabber.
Prosecutor Helmut Walch's remarks about Mannichl's case are in the 9 January 2009 article, "Fall Mannichl: Staatsanwalt spricht von 'Merkwürdigkeiten'" ["Mannichl case: public prosecutor speaks of 'strangenesses'"], by Max Hägler at the sueddeutsche.de Web site. Partly as an result of Mannichl's crime report about a stranger who seemed to be politically motivated, a court ordered that two people be arrested. They were arrested. We guess that they're innocent and that their arrest records won't be expunged. We should carefully evaluate reports that a government officer was criminally, violently attacked at his home by a stranger. This Alois Mannichl discussion is based on our understanding of what we read on the Web.
- Oldenburg
Incidentally, some, possible implications of the Mannichl case above remind us of events in Oldenburg, Niedersachsen, involving someone (seemingly an Oldenburg police officer) who tried to scare a Jew by trying to trick him into thinking that a harmless, cooperating skinhead near a school building was really a threatening, Nazi skinhead. (Incidentally, there is reason to suspect that a second, harmless, cooperating skinhead at an intersection soon after also was intended to be part of the attempted trick.) The Jew (partly because he had experience with real, Nazi skinheads in Germany) was not fooled. In summary, an Oldenburger who seems to have been a police officer pretended that there would be a Nazi threat; and we were reminded of that by some, possible implications of the Mannichl case. We think that there is a German, federal agency which collects information about contemporary, Nazi crimes and incidents in Germany. We don't know if that agency knows about these Oldenburg events.
- Consider 2009may12
Consider Crisishost, easyDNS, and Wonkette.
- Opposition
This Web site generates much opposition. For example, the following are a few of those who have expressed opposition to this Web site: a few New York City government officers (police commissioner, Republican leader of city council, mayor), a few media outlets in or near New York City (Reader's Digest magazine, New York Daily News newspaper, New York Post newspaper, 1010 WINS radio, Fox TV channel 5), Germany's consulate in New York City, and some California politicians and organizations. Off the Hook radio show seemed somewhat favorable to this Web site. More information (about media reaction to this Web site) is available on this Web site's main publicity page.
- Please boycott Germany to the extent, if any, it is legal and convenient for you to do so.
|
SM
